This paper assumes that in addition to the conventional (selfish) preferences over outcomes, players in a strategic environment have preferences over strategies. In the context of twoplayer games, it provides conditions under which a player's preferences over strategies can be represented as a weighted average of the individual's selfish payoffs and the selfish payoffs of the opponent. The weight one player places on the opponent's selfish utility depends on the opponent's behavior. In this way, the framework is rich enough to describe the behavior of individuals who repay kindness with kindness and meanness with meanness. The paper assumes that each player has an ordering over his opponent's strategies that describes the niceness of these strategies. It introduces a condition that insures that the weight on opponent's utility increases if and only if the opponent chooses a nicer strategy. 
Introduction
The notion that economic agents act rationally is a premise that unites most work in economic theory. The rationality assumption is often stated broadly and implemented narrowly. The broad version of the assumption is that agents are goal oriented and seek to maximize preferences subject to constraints. The narrow v ersion of the assumption is that an individual's preferences are exogenously given and depend only on those aspects of an allocation that directly in uence his or her material well being. This paper lays the foundations for an extension of the narrow view of rationality in strategic settings. No modi cation of game theory is needed to permit individuals to be motivated by something other than material well being. The utility in standard game theory may be derived from arbitrary preferences over outcome distributions. Our theory goes beyond this. We present a representation theorem in games that incorporates the possibility that preferences will be in uenced by the behavior of others.
Game theory always assumes that players have preference relationships de ned on lotteries over outcomes. Our starting point is to also assume that players have preferences over strategies. Since the space of mixed strategies is a mixture space, it lends itself to the expected utility setup. In other words, we assume that for any three strategies . This, together with continuity and transitivity, implies that preferences over strategies can be represented by an expected utility functional, where the utility is a utility from strategies. This utility does not have to agree with the expected utility from payo s obtained when the player uses this strategy.
We limit attention to two-player games. Section 2 presents the basic representation theorem. We show that in a xed game G, and given that his opponent is playing j , player i's preferences over his own strategies i will be represented by a utility function of the form u 1 i ; j + a G i; j u 2 i ; j the representation is a weighted sum of the two players' utilities, where the weight player i gives to player j's utility depends on j's action. This result is a consequence of a theorem due to Harsanyi 27 . The critical assumption is that if, given a xed strategy of player j, t wo of player i's strategies lead to the same distribution of sel sh expected utility for both players, then player i is indi erent b e t ween these two strategies. The coe cients a G i; j represent the degree to which player i is willing to take person j's interests into consideration. In standard theory, a G i; j 0. Positive v alues of the coe cient suggest that player i is willing to sacri ce his sel sh payo in order to increase the payo of his opponent. Negative v alues suggest a willingness to sacri ce sel sh payo in order to lower the opponent's payo . Since player i's coe cient depends on player j's strategy, the players may exhibit preferences for reciprocity. A player may be willing to make sel sh sacri ces to increase or decrease his opponent's payo in the same strategic setting.
We allow the possibility that one player's preferences over outcomes can re ect concern for the well being of the other player. That is, we allow players to be intrinsically altruistic or spiteful. More important, however, is that we permit a player's preferences over strategies to place a higher weight o n opponent's sel sh payo s in response to nice behavior. This is done in Section 3, where we connect the coe cient a G i; j to the way player i perceives j's behavior. The goal is to formalize the intuition that a player would respond to nice behavior by reducing his sel sh utility to bene t his opponent and respond to nasty behavior by reducing his sel sh utility to harm his opponent. We assume that player i has preferences over his opponent's strategies, which describe his view of their`niceness'. Section 3 we identi es conditions under which a G i; j a G i; 0 j if and only if i is`nicer' than 0 j . This theorem captures the idea that a player is more likely to be kind to an opponent who treats him nicely. In order to prove the result, we i n troduce a Reciprocal Altruism assumption that makes precise the intuition behind the theorem. Section 4 discusses possible objections to our model and describes several examples that illustrate its features. Section 5 brie y reviews the most relevant experiments in the vast literature detailing shortcomings of the rational actor model. It provides a more detailed discussion of closely related theoretic responses to the evidence.
Representation Theorems
Assume two players. Let X i be the space of outcomes to player i, i = 1 ; 2.
Each player has sel sh" preferences sel i over X i , the space of lotteries over X i . A game G is a collection s G i = fs G;1 i ; : : : ; s Let G i be the space of mixed strategies of player i for game G, and extend O G to be from G 1 G 2 to X 1 X 2 . Throughout the paper, i; j 2 f 1; 2g, and i 6 = j.
Given a game G and his opponent's mixed strategy j 2 j , player i has a complete and transitive preference relation G i; j over G i . As long as G is xed, we omit the superscript G, and use the notations s i , i , and i; j . The preferences i; j over strategies need not be linked to the sel sh preferences sel i over outcomes. We assume that these preferences satisfy the following axioms. As sel sh preferences sel i are de ned over X i , these preferences exist independently of the strategic environment. Preferences over strategies G i; j , on the other hand, depend on the game being played. In this framework, a Nash Equilibrium is a strategy pro le in which each agent's strategy is maximal according to G i; j . Lemma 1 asserts that a Nash Equilibrium exists in our framework. We omit the proof, which follows from standard arguments.
Lemma 1 If, for a given game G, b oth players' preferences satisfy the Continuity and the Independence axioms, then Nash Equilibrium exists for this game.
We make t wo more assumptions.
EU Expected Utility The preferences sel i satisfy the assumptions of expected utility theory.
It follows by this axiom that there are vN M utility functions u i : X i ! R such that the preferences sel i over lotteries over X i are represented by the expected value of the utility u i from their payo s. To simplify notation, denote by u i i ; j the expectation of the utility u i player i receives from the lottery O i i ; j O i is the lottery person i receives from O. Let u i ; j = u i i ; j ; u j i ; j . 1 For part b of the Continuity assumption, see Section 3 below.
3
SI Self Interest Suppose that u j 0 i ; j = u j i ; j . Then 0 i i; j i if, and only if, u i 0 i ; j u i i ; j . This axiom is weaker than the one usually used. In standard game theory, it is assumed that 0 i i; j i i u i 0 i ; j u i i ; j . That is, the preferences of person i over his own set of strategies, given that player j is playing j , are fully determined by i's payo . Here we only require that player i's preferences over strategies agree with his sel sh preferences when player j is sel shly indi erent b e t ween i and 0 i . Axiom SI implies in particular ? If u 0 i ; j = u i ; j , then 0 i i; j i .
The structure of the model so far resembles that of Harsanyi's social choice theory 27 . In his model, members of society h a ve preferences over lotteries over social states, and these preferences are expected utility. There are social preferences over the same domain, and these preferences too are expected utility. Finally, a P areto assumption connects these preferences, where it is assumed that if all members of society are indi erent b e t ween two social policies, then so is society. F rom these assumptions Harsanyi got the utilitarian" social welfare function Note that the weights depend on j's strategy j . In standard game theory, a i i; j 1 and a j i; j 0. Here we can only retain the rst of these two identities.
Lemma 2 Given the Self Interest assumption, a i i; j can be chosen to be p ositive, i = 1 ; 2, j 6 = i. Proof For a given j , the set S j = fu i ; j : i 2 i g is either a chord in R 
Conclusion 1
We m a y assume, without loss of generality, that a i i; j 1. That is, the preferences i; j can be represented by u i i ; j + a j i; j u j i ; j Note, however, that a j i; j may be negative. For simplicity, w e omit the superscript j, and let a i; j be the weight player i gives to the utility of player j.
Reciprocal Altruism
We n o w assume that player i has continuous preferences opp i over j , the set of player j's strategies, i = 1 ; 2, j 6 = i. The superscript opp stands for opponent". The interpretation of the statement 1 j opp i 2 j " is that player i considers j to be nicer to him when j is using 1 j than when she is using In this section we analyze the connection between these preferences and the weight a i; j player i gives to j's utility. The main results of the section are theorems that provide conditions that formalize the statement: The weight player i puts on player j's utility is an increasing function of the niceness of player j's strategy.
Nice Behavior
In this subsection we o er some examples for what we mean by nice behavior, but our results apply to a much larger set of preferences. Given that player j is using strategy j These functional forms o er two di erent notions of nice behavior. According to the rst, person j's behavior is nicer if she o ers player i higher possible utility. This representation is consistent with the concept of fairness adopted by Rabin 39 . The second notion of niceness is for player j to let player i have high minimal utility. A possible justi cation for this is that if player j believes that i does not understand the game, she can protect him by increasing his security level. We do not consider such preferences in our analysis, and will assume throughout that the preferences opp i depend only on the vector u i s i ; j .
Below w e i n troduce two axioms. The rst, called Reciprocal Altruism, connects the preferences i; j player i has over his set of strategies, to the 2 Another possibility i s U i u i s 1 i ; j ; : : : ; u i s ni i ; j = P k u i s k i ; j . This notion suggests that player j is interested in maximizing player i's average utility. The reason may b e that since she believes that i does not know what to do, it is best to o er him the highest possible utility assuming that he will randomize. It is inconsistent with the Irrelevance axioms we make below.
preferences opp i he has over j's behavior. The second, called Irrelevance, connects the preferences i; j in di erent games. The combination of the two axioms rules out some possible preferences opp i , but it is lenient enough to permit the functional forms of eq. 2 and eq. 3.
The Reciprocal Altruism Axiom
In this subsection we describe the Reciprocal Altruism axiom. This axiom formalizes the idea that players are willing to reward nice behavior, and to punish mean behavior. The axiom requires that if all things are equal," then when player j plays a nicer strategy, player i will prefer strategies that lead to larger sel sh payo s to player j. In this way, the axiom formalizes the notion that player i repays kindness with kindness. The conditions in the statement of the axiom formalize the notion of what it means for all things to be equal. The axiom places a restriction on player i's ranking in one situation, indicated by the superscript 2 on strategies, using information about his ranking in another situation, indicated by the superscript 1 on strategies condition c. Condition a requires that the information about i . In the appendix we describe a nontrivial example of preferences that satisfy all of our assumptions.
RA Reciprocal Altruism
Condition a in the Reciprocal Altruism axiom is restrictive. For example, when n i = 2 it is possible to satisfy condition a for 1 j 6 = 2 j only for nongeneric payo s. Put di erently, if for a given strategy j of player j, the utility opportunity set that can be generated by i strategies is a line in the two-dimensional sel sh utility space, then it is impossible to determine the value of a i; j used by person i. The restrictive nature of condition a suggests that the Reciprocal Altruism axiom is relatively weak. We m ust combine it with other assumptions to link player i's preferences over his opponent's choice of strategy to a i; j , the weight person i is gives to j's utility.
Since all the relevant information of a game is summarized by the sel sh utility p a yo s the two players receive, we can view games as elements of R 2n 1 n 2 . On the set of games G n 1 n 2 with n i pure strategies for player i, i = 1 ; 2, we use the Euclidean topology. The set of mixed strategies i for a game G n i n j can be viewed as the simplex n i = fp 1 ; : : : ; p n i 2 R n i + :
P p k = 1 g. With a little abuse of notation, we will write i 2 n i .
C Continuity b Fix n i and n j . F or every i 2 n i and j 2 n j , the sets f i ; G 2 n i G n i n j : i G i; j i g and f i ; G 2 n i G n i n j : i G i; j i g are closed subsets of n i G n i n j . Axiom Ca requires that preferences are continuous within a xed game. The present axiom requires that G i; j be continuous as G changes but with j held xed.
Theorems
As we h a ve mentioned above, the set of sel sh utility p a yo s may be too thin to apply the RI axiom. To solve this problem, we will replace the game G with a game that will duplicate one of player i's strategies. Then we will use Axiom Cb, and create a thicker set of possible utility p a yo s by c hanging this new strategy in a small neighborhood. This axiom states that a player's preferences between any t wo strategies will not change if a strategy of any one of the players is duplicated. This axiom trivially rules out the functional form for nice behavior of footnote 2, where person i is interested in the average value of the weighted sum of his and his opponent utility levels. The reason is that duplicating a strategy will change the average payo , hence, by Axiom RI, it will also change player i's ranking of his own strategies.
Our aim is to prove that a i; There are three parts to the proof of this theorem. In the rst part, we assume that the utility opportunity sets are su ciently rich that we can apply Axiom RA directly. In this case, it is possible to nd strategies that satisfy the condition of RA. The desired conclusion is a straightforward computation. To carry out this argument, we need S to have a nonempty interior. The second part of the part uses the linear ordering property t o obtain the conclusion of the theorem when S has an empty i n terior, but S i has a nonempty i n terior for all strategies on a segment connecting When preferences are represented by either eq. 2 or eq. 3, the rst condition of ?? follows immediately. Since the utility function of eq. 2 is quasi convex and that of eq. 3 is quasi concave, the second condition of ?? can be satis ed with n = 3 .
The assumption that follows permits us to conclude that S i 1 j and S i 2 j share at least one utility level for player j as well. To do so, we i n troduce our second way to compare games with di erent strategy sets.
According to our analysis, the preferences opp i are concerned with what is available to person i. Therefore, changing the utility level available to j will not a ect these preferences. We create the game Gì! b y adding a new strategy for player i that gives player i the same sel sh utilities as the existing strategy ì , but leads to a constant utility ! for player j. That is, for every k = 1 ; : : : ; n G j , us G`i!;n G i +1 i ; s G`i!;k j = u i s G;ì ; s G;k j ; ! As before, we denote by e h the strategy of player h in Gì! that is corresponding to h in G. De i . This axiom requires that if we add a strategy to player i that from his sel sh perspective is the same as a strategy he already has, and such that this strategy yields player j always the same`bad' outcome, then it will not change the way player i chooses from the old set of strategies. This does not mean that he is not going to choose the new strategy, only that its existence does not a ect his ranking of the other strategies. 
Discussion
This section discusses some possible questions and objections that relate to our model.
In what sense is this model different from standard game theory? One possible response to this question is that the present model permits players to use strategies that are dominated with respect to their sel sh payo s in equilibrium. It is straightforward to construct preferences over strategies, consistent with our assumptions, that permit the joint cooperation outcome to be an equilibrium in the prisoner's dilemma. 7 Intuitively, cooperation is a way of responding nicely to nice behavior.
Precisely the same prediction would follow, however, if we rede ned the payo s associated with outcomes, and use standard game theory. F or example, if we treat the players in the prisoner's dilemma as risk-neutral agents who maximize monetary payo s, the game matrix may look like 3; 3 0; 4 4; 0 1; 1 However, if we permit more general preferences over outcomes, for example, if preferences are over payo distributions, then the strategic environment may be represented by 3; 3 0; 0 0; 0 1; 1
In this example, both players' utilities are functions of the joint income distribution, and are given by u i x i ; x j = u j x i ; x j = minfx i ; x j g.
Our approach does more than can be done by simply rede ning preferences over outcomes. The following example demonstrates that, in contrast to standard game theory, if a strategy is a unique best response to every pure strategy, then it need not be a dominant strategy. Consider the following example.
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The players are going to cook dinner together. Player i will bring the main course, either beef U or pheasant D. Player j will bring the wine, either red L or white R. Player i prefers red wine to white and pheasant to beef.
Player j prefers to drink red wine with beef, but hates a beef-white wine menu. If the weight that player i gives to player j's utility when j brings red wine is su ciently positive greater than 1 2 , then the optimal response of player i to red wine is to supply beef. On the other hand, if player j brings white wine, player i will give j's utility a negative w eight, and if it is su ciently negative that is, less than , 1 10 , he will punish" her by making her eat beef with the wrong wine. Under standard analysis, this means that player i should always play U . H o wever, if player j uses a non-degenerate mixed strategy, player i may give j's utility zero weight, and eat pheasant. If player j always places zero weight on her opponent's utility, then we get two Nash equilibria, one is up left, the other is down for player i and a mixed strategy say 1 2 , 1 2 for player j. It is easy to verify that such a set of equilibrium points cannot be obtained under standard game theory.
Maybe it is better to extend the set of strategies and assume a violation of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom RCLA? Suppose we consider all mixtures as pure strategies. That is, strategy s for player i is play a lottery where with probability you choose beef, and with probability 1 , you choose pheasant." Similarly, strategy for player j is to play a lottery where with probability t she will bring a bottle of white wine, and with probability 1 , she will bring a bottle of red wine. Of course, if player i is indi erent b e t ween the mixed strategy s with probability p and s 0 with probability 1 , p" and the pure strategy s p +1,p 0, then this extra structure will make no di erence. So assume that this last indi erence is sometimes violated. In other words, assume that players' preferences violate RCLA. 8 Permitting arbitrary violations of RCLA would provide an alternative explanation of the pheasant-beef example. There is no systematic theory of violations of RCLA that would account for the example, however. Indeed, although many experiments show widespread violations of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom see references in 43 , all experiments that we know show nonindi erence between 1. A lottery that yields with probability p k a ticket to a lottery that yields x k with probability 1 , k = 1 ; : : : ; m . 2. A lottery that with probability 1 yields a ticket to a lottery that with probability p k pays x k , k = 1 ; : : : ; m . In other words, 9 the pure strategy s 0:5 must be indi erent in player i's preferences to the mixture s 1 ; 1 2 ; s 0 ; 1 2 . So even if we n o w h a ve t wo pure-strategies equilibria s 1 ; t 1 and s 0 ; t 0:5 , there is still the mixed strategy equilibrium where player i plays down, and player j plays left or right with probability 1 2 each. As before, s 1 is the unique best response to both pure strategies of player j, but there exists an equilibrium in which player i uses his other pure strategy. In standard models, where players care only about their own utility, taking a positive a ne transformation of person i's utility will not change the nature of the game. Since eq. 1 involves utility levels of more than one player, will changing the vN M utility index of a player change the nature of the game? This turns out to be one of the major obstacles in social choice theory, where one person's manipulation of utility m a y c hange the social optimum see Weymark 47 . Despite its similarity to Harsanyi's utilitarian framework, our model does not su er from this problem. It is straightforward to check that if for k = i; j, e u k = k u k + k with k 0, then the utility function u i +a i; j u j represents the same preferences as e u i +e a j i; j e u j , where When there are more than two players, new issues arise involving how t o de ne preferences over opponents' strategies. Probably the most di cult of them is how should player i evaluate person j's utility, when person j is nice to k but mean to`. W e do not deal with these issues here.
Related Literature
There is a large literature that documents instances in which agents reward kindness and punish nastiness in ways that are di cult to explain using conventional economic models of agents maximizing their material payo s.
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This section describes some of this literature and indicates, informally, the extent to which our approach is consistent with empirical ndings.
Many papers have been written on the ultimatum game and its simpler relation, the dictator game. 12 In the ultimatum game, one player o ers a division of a xed surplus, and the other player can either accept or reject. If it is accepted, player one's o er determines material payo s for both players. Otherwise, neither player receives anything. In the dictator game, the second player must accept the rst player's o er. Experiments nd that the rst player o ers a positive amount to the second player in dictator games amounts are sensitive t o h o w the game is framed, and that in ultimatum games the rst player o ers even more, with the second player rejecting relatively small o ers. Informal notions of fairness appear to play a role in the experiments with equal division given prominence that it would not receive in a conventional theory. If the second player can make a counterproposal after rejecting the initial o er, disadvantageous countero ers o ers in which player two rejects player one's o er only to make a countero er that yields him a lower monetary payo than the rejected o er arise Ochs and Roth 37 . If agents have preferences that are described by eq. 1, then disadvantageous countero ers arise for the same reason that unfair o ers are rejected in the ultimatum game: In response to a nasty strategy, a player puts negative w eight on his opponent's material payo and is therefore willing to sacri ce his own material payo in order to reduce his opponent's material payo .
In models of gift exchange, 13 the second agent t o m o ve rewards behavior that is kind and, to a greater extent, punishes unkind behavior. The moonlighting game of Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner 2 is a paradigmatic example. Player one rst decides on a transfer to player two. The transfer can be positive or negative. Positive transfers to player two are tripled for every $1 player one donates, player two receives $3. The second player observes the rst player's decision and can either reward or punish the rst player. Rewards to player one are tripled. However, in order to reduce player one's payo by $1, player two m ust sacri ce $1. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium for this game when players are motivated solely by their material payo s, player two neither rewards nor punishes player one be-cause both actions are costly, but yield no material gain, while player one takes the maximum possible amount from player two. In experiments, player one typically makes a positive transfer to player two. Player two tends to reward positive transfers and punish negative ones. The results are consistent with equilibrium behavior under the assumptions that player two places a negative w eight on player one's material payo when player one takes money from player two and places a positive w eight on player one's material payo when one gives money to two.
There are games in which experimental results are more consistent with the predictions of equilibrium behavior of sel sh players. 14 Games that operate like markets or auctions tend to replicate conventional equilibrium predictions for two reasons. First, the predictions of market models remain valid if only a small number of participants in the model behave sel shly. Since experimental results con rm the existence of some individuals that behave sel shly, the outcomes are consistent with other market participants having a preference for reciprocity. Second, in some games the kindness ordering i is likely to be degenerate. For example, in the best-shot game in which t wo players sequentially make contributions c i and material payo s are fmaxc 1 ; c 2 , c i , for f increasing and f 0 0 1, the theoretical prediction that player one makes no contribution and player two's contribution solves: max c 2 fc 2 , c 2 is consistent with experimental ndings. These ndings are also consistent with a model in which agents have a preference for reciprocity. P artial contributions from player one do not in uence player two's maximum payo , so our theory would not predict that player two w ould sacri ce material payo in order to punish player one if player one contributes nothing.
Interesting attempts to explain these ndings using models of learning and bounded rationality 15 or cognitive psychology for example, Jacobsen and Sadrieh 31 contribute ideas that complement our approach. Most related to our approach, however, are models that assume equilibrium behavior of optimizing agents, but relax the assumption that agents seek to maximize their material utility. Bolton and Ockenfels 8 , 16 Fehr and Schmidt 19 , Levine 34 , and Rabin 39 introduce models of this kind. The main contribution of our paper is that it provides an axiomatic foundation for using extended preferences of this sort in strategic settings; the other papers provide no formal justi cation for the functional forms that they use. The di erent papers provide similar, but distinct, predictions. It may be useful to contrast the approaches. Bolton and Ockenfels 8 and Fehr and Schmidt 19 present models in which agents have preferences that exhibit inequality a version. In these models, agents are willing to sacri ce their own material payo if by doing so they obtain a payo that is closer to some measure of what other agents receive. In contrast to our approach, therefore, one player's preferences do not depend on the intentions of his opponents. Provided that it is possible to identify the comparison group to which an individual compares his payo , it should be possible to distinguish the predictions between these theories and ours. 17 The intentions of other players are important in Rabin's 39 model. He uses the theory of psychological games Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti 22 to allow beliefs about an opponent's intentions to determine an equilibrium. Our approach demonstrates that intentions can be included in a game-theoretic analysis without using psychological games. Rabin makes restrictive assumptions about the weight that one player places on his opponent's utility. 18 Under these assumptions, he is able to derive some general properties of the fairness equilibria that he studies. These properties would not hold universally in our model.
Rabin explicitly assumes that an agent cares about his opponent's material payo only as a response to intentions. For this reason, his approach 16 Bolton 7 i n troduces a related approach. 17 Experiments conducted by Blount 10 and Charness 12 nds evidence for reciprocal behavior in situations where rst-move in ultimatum and gift-exchange games are random. These results suggest that the desire to reciprocate is not simply a response to an opponent's intentions. 18 The functional forms Rabin chooses to describe fairness reduce his model's ability t o explain some observations. Hausman 28 argues that Rabin's approach does not provide a satisfactory prediction in gift-exchange models.
can be distinguished from the inequality a version models of Bolton and Ockenfels 8 and Fehr and Schmidt 19 or from our approach, which places few restrictions on the weight placed on opponent's utility. Nothing prevents a combination of the two approaches, however.
Rabin's use of psychological games permits his model to include one qualitative phenomena that would not arise using our approach. His paper provides an example of a game in which a player could use the same strategy in two distinct strict psychological equilibria. This cannot happen using conventional Nash equilibrium. In his analysis of the battle of the sexes, there are two strict equilibria in which j plays right. What is peculiar about this is that up is a strict best response to right in one situation, but down is a strict best response to right in another. This can happen for Rabin because in psychological games expectations matter. So, if i thinks that j is playing right because j thinks that i is playing down, then i thinks that j is being nice, and is willing to be nice and play d o wn. If i thinks that j is playing right because j thinks that i is playing up, then i thinks that j is being nasty, and is willing to be nasty and play up.
In Levine's 34 model, the weight a player places on his opponents' material payo s depends on what he thinks opponents' preferences are. Levine's players are inclined to make material sacri ces to bene t agents they believe to be altruistic and to harm agents they believe to be spiteful. These preferences do not depend on the behavior of opponents | unlike our approach the weight placed on opponents' strategies does not depend on the opponents' strategy choice. It should therefore be possible to identify the preferences of the agents in Levine's model using information from behavior in non-strategic settings.
The functional forms used by Bolton and Ockenfels 8 , Fehr and Schmidt 19 , and Rabin 39 all permit an explicit comparison between one player's payo s and those of his opponents'. In this way, these models incorporate informal notion of fairness into their analyses. Some kind of fairness seems necessary to explain the prominence of particular distributions for example, equal division across experimental studies. Our approach d o e s not restrict the way in which relative material payo s in uence a G i; j . Hence, we cannot explain the prominence of equal-division outcomes in ultimatum games without making further restrictions to our theory. 19 19 The linear speci cation of inequality a version used in Fehr and Schmidt 19 lacks the 22
